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is at a crossroads where politics overwhelmingly dominates economics. An accurate understanding of the
way in which the Turkish economy integrates into the global markets, therefore, will not be possible
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change, which is likely to be more authoritarian and less secular. It first emphasizes the Islamist-oriented
Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) radical policy discrepancies, which appear as inconsistencies at
first glance but in effect complement each other in the face of dynamic political changes to achieve a
regime change. It then focuses on the role of economic policies that were designed to create an artificial
economic miracle and to stimulate short-term consumption to achieve successive election victories.
However, since the “economic success” was built on weak fundamentals, only a more authoritarian
regime could rescue the AKP. The paper concludes by discussing the presidential system, which is
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Turkey at a Crossroads: The Political 
Economy of Turkey’s Transformation 
Introduction   
Turkey is at a crossroads where politics overwhelmingly dominates 
economics. The country is prepared for a radical transformation and 
potentially a regime change. The new constitution affirms that some 
form of a regime change is imminent and while its nature is not yet 
obvious, it is likely to be authoritarian and less secular. The regime 
change had been planned long before the Islamist-oriented Justice and 
Development Party (identified by the Turkish initials AKP) came to 
power in 2002, but has accelerated rapidly since then. As early as 
1994, Necmettin Erbakan (the former prime minister and a leading 
figure in Turkey’s Islamic movement) said at the meeting of his Party’s 
Parliamentary Group that “Refah Party will be elected and the justice 
system will be built. What is the remaining question? Will the transition 
period be tough or soft, bloody or bloodless?” (Salt 1999).  
This paper argues that, although they may look contradictory at 
times, all the policies adopted by the AKP were designed to facilitate 
this transformation. Pragmatism is the keyword to describe the AKP 
governments. As will be explained in details below, the level of 
pragmatism often took extremely “contradictory” forms, which led them 
to be perceived as inconsistencies. The radical policy discrepancies 
before and after the 2011 election are an obvious example. Between 
2002 and 2011, Turkey experienced considerable political and social 
progress. Democracy improved and initiatives for social peace 
accelerated. They were substantially reversed after 2011. Democracy 
deteriorated and the relative stability was replaced with political chaos.  
Turkey’s relationship with the neighbouring countries and the EU 
is another palpable example. Excellent relationships with the 
neighbouring countries under the “zero problems policy” were 
complemented with significant progress with the EU membership 
negotiations. Unfortunately, with the change of policies in 2011, the 
“zero problems policy” turned into a “zero friends policy” and the 
relationships with the EU deteriorated significantly.   
Policy regarding the Kurdish population is another area where 
we have seen a dramatic shift. While the relationship between the AKP 
and the Kurdish citizens has had ups and downs through many years, 
the AKP had maintained close links with the Kurdish voters. But when 
a solution to the Kurdish problem was perceived as imminent in 2015, 
the peace process unexpectedly crumbled. The AKP formed an 
alliance with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (identified by the 
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Turkish initials MHP), which opposes any kind of deals with the Kurdish 
movement.  
What explains these erratic policy reversals? The AKP 
supporters suggest that the AKP had to adopt temporary and mildly 
oppressive policies because it faced considerable hostility from the 
military and segments of the society with secular values. Additionally, 
they claim that the AKP had to respond to the changes in the external 
environment, which had become more hostile. Even for those 
supporters however, the AKP strayed too far from their original goals, 
and it was now time to get back to the “factory settings”. These claims 
have proven inaccurate since the AKP became more authoritarian as it 
became more powerful.      
This paper argues that there is no inconsistency between these 
seemingly contradictory policies. They complement each other to 
achieve a final objective: a regime change. The AKP needed the 
broadest political support to survive the above-mentioned hostility. The 
initial policies indeed brought together a vast section of the society and 
eased the concerns over secularism. The first period was designed to 
strengthen its powers in the face of many odds against the AKP. It was 
a period for developing and implementing both survival and defensive 
strategies. 
Economic policies played a decisive role in this process. Policies 
were adopted to maintain strong support from the most vulnerable 
sections of the society. The poor experienced some improvements in 
their living standards through policies that boosted consumption. An 
illusion of economic miracle was also created. The economy appeared 
to grow rapidly while remaining resilient against internal and external 
shocks. While these policies were unsustainable in the long run, they 
were necessary in the short run to bolster the AKP’s electoral appeal 
and to secure successive election victories. 
The second phase can be called the transformation (or 
offensive) period. Once a strong government was secured and the 
threats were eliminated, it was time to move to the next stage where 
the process of regime change could begin. This stage inevitably 
required more authoritarianism since the fear of a regime change 
created strong opposition. Luckily for the AKP, however, almost all the 
strategic positions within the state apparatus were now under their 
control. Neither the military nor the people with secular values could 
pose a serious risk. This phase, however, witnessed lethal struggles 
within the AKP. The common survival instincts in the first phase united 
the different fractions in the AKP. Once the second phase started, 
however, struggles for more power within the party between former 
allies-turned-enemies – Erdoganists and Gulenists (who advocate 
alternative versions of Islam) – increased significantly. Internal 
struggles eventually turned into serious conflicts and led to the coup 
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attempt in 2016 by the Gulenists. The 2016 coup attempt, which was 
later considered as a “gift from God” by the Erdoganists, turned into an 
“opportunity” and the subsequent state of emergency was used not 
only to eradicate the risks associated with the Gulenists but also 
employed to coerce a wide range of opponents. While the coup was a 
big blow for the Erdoganists in the AKP, now that the Gulenists were 
largely defeated, the transformation phase could continue as the 
Erdoganists wished. 
Yet there was a time pressure on the Erdoganists since the 
“economic success” was built on weak fundamentals and was, 
therefore, unsustainable. A massive crisis or a perpetually low growth 
rates appear to be imminent: the signs are getting stronger. The 
relative sense of indulgence is likely to be replaced with a relative 
sense of indigence. Once this happens, the AKP’s long lasting 
hegemony would be shaken and its long-term plans would be in 
jeopardy. For this reason, the AKP pressed for a radical constitutional 
change, pushing for a referendum under the state of emergency in an 
environment marked by social and political chaos that was undermining 
its legitimacy. Only a more authoritarian regime could rescue the AKP 
and allow it to achieve its long-term objectives. 
Economics and politics are inextricably linked in all countries. 
This is particularly true for Turkey during the AKP period due to the 
above-mentioned transformation. An accurate understanding of the 
way in which the Turkish economy integrates into the global markets 
and the development pattern selected by the AKP will not be possible 
unless the broader political context is understood. Consequently, this 
article will first consider the political developments in Turkey since the 
AKP came to power. The following section, covers the AKP’s radical 
policy discrepancies, which appear as inconsistencies at first glance 
but in effect complement each other in the face of dynamic political 
changes to achieve a regime change. The paper will then focus on the 
role of economic policies that were designed to create an artificial 
economic miracle and to stimulate short-term consumption to achieve 
successive election victories. The focus will be on how the miracle 
illusion was created through a number of creative policies and 
conjectural factors. Before concluding, the paper will discuss the 
presidential system, which is essential to seal what has been achieved 
and facilitate further and more radical transformations.      
Contradictions or Pragmatism 
Politics is a dynamic process where political actors frequently reorient 
themselves, sometimes surprisingly rapidly and radically. However, the 
level of the AKP’s “pragmatism” is unprecedented in Turkish politics. 
Rapid and radical policy shifts, U-turns and the large gaps between the 
rhetoric and actual policies appeared as inconsistencies to many 
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analysts. To give one illuminating example, on 29 November 2016, 
Erdogan said that the goal of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield in 
Syria was the overthrow of Assad. Just two days later, in the face of 
Russian reactions however, he said that his words should not be 
twisted, as the operation targeted no country or specific person but 
only terror organizations (Martel 2016). Both speeches were 
passionate enough to make one doubt what Erdogan actually said. 
Very often, Erdogan says something inconceivable and his supporters 
tell the public that what he means is, in fact, different. The AKP 
supporters respond to these inconsistencies by claiming that he is in 
the game of politics and such pragmatism is what makes him a great 
leader.  
Such major and regular inconsistencies may lead to the 
perception that Turkey is led by incompetent leaders who are drunk 
with power and cannot decide on clear policy aims. This perception is 
wrong. It is not easy to make sense of the AKP policies unless the 
predominant objective is kept in mind: a regime change. The strength 
of the AKP lies in the belief that all policies are justified for the greater 
cause. The necessity of this level of pragmatism is well understood by 
its supporters. Challenged by the 17-25 December 2013 corruption 
allegations, for example, the supporters often concede the problems in 
private but they claim that they are not for personal interests but for the 
“cause”. 
This level of pragmatism is not unique to Erdoganists. Their 
former coalition partners, the Gulenists, also displayed masterful skills 
in this area. Fethullah Gulen’s organisation concealed itself as a 
moderately religious charity. Gulen urged his followers to infiltrate the 
state and wait for the right time to rise up. To avoid the crackdowns in 
the army, the Gulenists officers “stocked their refrigerators with decoy 
bottles of alcohol and planted empties in the trash” and the Gulenist 
wives “started wearing bikinis more revealing than their hosts” at the 
pool parties (Filkins 2016). The Gulenists became more visible under 
the AKP rule but they remained invisible in strategic organisations such 
as the army. Although the Erdoganists claim that the Gulenists 
infiltrated into the state before the AKP came to power, no former 
governments planted them within the most important state apparatuses 
so openly and willingly. Indeed, Erdogan once said that he “gave them 
everything they wanted” (The Financial Times 2014). 
The most important policy changes occurred after the 2011 
elections. The policies were relatively progressive between 2002 and 
2011 when significant economic, political and social improvements 
were achieved. In this period, the AKP formed coalitions with many 
segments of society. The AKP has been remarkably successful in 
terms of forming coalitions and breaking them apart once their 
objectives were achieved. The support from the liberal intelligentsia, 
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who had hoped that the main objective of the AKP was to overcome 
the democratic deficits of the Kemalist regime, was particularly 
important to help to ease the fears of regime change. The liberals 
believed that the AKP would establish true democracy by removing the 
influence of the military over democratic institutions, introduce more 
freedom to the oppressed minorities, and resolve the gangrenous 
Kurdish issue. 
Indeed, significant progress had been made on all fronts. The 
large portion of the population, including influential liberal intellectuals 
and external commentators, supported and praised these policies. The 
AKP won all the local and general elections and increased its lead, 
which is unique in Turkey’s political history. Even the AKP’s ideological 
opponents secretly admired this success.  
These policies all changed rather abruptly from 2011 when the 
AKP received almost 50 percent of the votes. With an increased 
confidence, the AKP government became increasingly authoritarian 
which caused heightened public concerns and led to the Gezi Park 
protests in May 2013. The coalitions within the AKP started crumbling. 
The conflict between the Erdoganists and the Gulenists led to the 
major corruption allegations (led by the Gulenists) in December 2013. 
Erdoganists response to these two setbacks was to increase 
authoritarianism even further.  
Here is a non-exhaustive list of policy switches that may at first 
appear as inconsistencies:  
1. Democratic reforms and basic rights 
Major democratic reforms were introduced within the first few years of 
the AKP government. The AKP started a campaign against torture and 
ill treatment, abolished the death penalty, adopted the European 
Convention of Human Rights, abolished the notorious Article 8 of the 
Anti-Terror Law which had been used for the imprisonment of 
journalists for crimes against Turkey’s “unitary” structure, ratified the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and abolished the 
State Security Courts (Bac 2005).  
Press freedom improved considerably. According to the World 
Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (2016), Turkey 
was ranked 119th out of 166 countries in 2003, 98th in 2005 and 99th in 
2008 that signifies a substantial improvement in a short period of time. 
The influence of the military over politics was brought under democratic 
control through a number of reforms (such as increasing the number of 
civilian members of the National Security Council and appointing a 
civilian as its Secretary General) and court cases were launched to 
determine the involvement of many high-ranking officers in a coup 
attempt against the government (Bac 2005).  
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Reducing (or scrapping) the electoral threshold to create 
adequate room for small parties to secure state financing and 
parliamentary representation was considered. Radical reforms for the 
higher education were announced which included the abolishment of 
the Higher Education Board (identified by the Turkish initials YOK). 
YOK was established after the 1980 military coup and has been 
criticised for its over-centralised policies that curtailed academic 
freedoms. The proposed system would allow the University Senates to 
elect their rectors to ensure greater academic freedom and autonomy. 
A series of democratic initiatives were launched and aimed at 
extending basic rights and freedoms of the citizens regardless of their 
ethnicity, religion, social class and political views. Some progress was 
made regarding religious freedoms. The restrictions on the use of the 
headscarf in public life were abolished and it was progressively allowed 
in schools and state institutions (including the army). There were a few 
gestures toward the other religious minorities. Alternative formulations 
to reopen the Halki Seminary (the Greek orthodox theological School 
that was closed down in 1971) were developed in 2004 and 2005. 
Reforms for the Alevis (the largest religious minority in Turkey) 
were discussed and a legislation that would grant Cemevis (Alevi’s 
places of worship) legal status was planned. Accordingly, the state 
would provide financial support to Cemevis and pay the salaries of 
Dedes (Alevi religious leaders). The AKP largely convinced the public 
that freedom of religion would be interpreted broadly in line with 
international norms and secularism was not under threat. Erdogan not 
only defended secularism in Turkey but also advocated it for the Arab 
world (Kuru 2013).  
The ethnic reforms covered the Armenian, Roma and Kurdish 
initiatives. The Armenian initiative involved the restoration of an 
old Armenian church and allowing TV broadcasts in Armenian. The 
initiative also permitted a religious ceremony at the historical Armenian 
church after a 95-year hiatus. The Roma initiative addressed the 
widespread discrimination against the Romani people, and included an 
increased recognition of their identity and a boost in social programs to 
better integrate them into the society. The AKP also started the peace 
process with the Kurds, which deserves a separate section presented 
below. 
After the 2011 elections, however, democratic reforms were 
reversed. Data from the Fraser Institute, Economist Intelligence Unit 
and the Freedom House (see Figure 1) all suggest that the key aspects 
of democratic life (judicial independence, impartial courts, integrity of 
the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, reliability of police, 
electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government and civil 
liberties) improved within the first few years of the AKP government but 
then deteriorated significantly. Despite the numerous “wide-ranging” 
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packages of political reforms unveiled by the AKP, these often 
remained as lip service to set the stage for upcoming elections and fell 
far short of expectations. 
Figure 1: Changes in the quality of democratic institutions 
Fraser Institute EIU Freedom House 
 
  
Sources: Fraser Institute, Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom 
House. 
Notes: A higher score denotes a better quality of institutions. 
Fraser Institute: Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World 
Index, EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, Freedom 
House: Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index. 
Press freedoms also deteriorated significantly. Many journalists 
have been jailed, including the liberals who strongly supported the AKP 
in the past. In a letter written to their foreign ministry, Swedish 
newspaper editors argued that Turkey was now the world’s biggest 
prison for journalists. A partisan media has been created and the 
opposition media has been suppressed. Dogan Media Group (the main 
media group in Turkey), for example, faced the largest ever tax penalty 
in Turkey’s history in 2009 – a penalty that was politically motivated 
(Sozeri 2015). Many newspapers and TV channels have been 
shutdown over “terror propaganda”. Turkey’s rank in the World Press 
Freedom Index deteriorated rapidly from the 99th in 2008 to 138th in 
2016 and 155th in 2017. The Freedom House (2016) reported that  
[Media] freedom in Turkey deteriorated at an alarming rate in 
2015. The government (…) aggressively used the penal code, 
criminal defamation legislation, and the country’s antiterrorism 
law to punish critical reporting, and journalists faced growing 
violence, harassment, and intimidation from both state and 
nonstate actors during the year. (…) The authorities continued 
to use financial and administrative leverage over media owners 
to influence coverage and silence dissent. 
While the military’s power over politics has been brought under 
democratic control, the court cases against the high-ranking officers 
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(such as Ergenekon and Balyoz) were plots to eliminate the non-
Gulenist officers in the army which eventually resulted in the Gulenists 
led coup attempt in 2016. The Gulenists have been infiltrating the army 
since 1990s. They planted their members in the ranks by cheating on 
the entrance exams to the military schools and then removed the non-
Gulenists by torturing them under the banner of training.  
Despite the earlier promise, higher education was not reformed 
and the YOK was not abolished. Up until recently, university rectors 
had been appointed by the president from a list of candidates who 
were selected by their university staff members and recommended by 
the YOK. When the AKP came to power, the former President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer did not appoint the AKP adherents as rectors. Once 
Abdullah Gul became the president in 2007, however, (with the 
exception of few elite universities) all rectors were appointed from the 
AKP adherents and there were no more incentives to reform the higher 
education sector. After the coup attempt in 2016, rector elections were 
abolished and now the president appoints one of three candidates 
recommended by the YOK. The former AKP Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu once invited the Turkish academics around the world to 
come to Turkey and claimed that he was the guardian of their 
academic freedom. Since the coup, however, a large number of 
academics have been prosecuted, expelled from their posts and even 
jailed for “crimes” such as signing a petition. 
The electoral threshold remains at ten percent and hinders the 
smaller parties. Erdogan recently said that the presidential system had 
long been his own personal project. Given that the presidential system 
is designed to give immense powers to the president and makes the 
parliamentary representation futile, the sincerity of the democratisation 
of the electoral system can be questioned.  
The promise of religious freedom has largely been left 
unfulfilled. Halki Seminary remains closed and the Alevi reforms were 
not implemented. Religious freedom has been interpreted narrowly to 
support the dominant Sunni Islam. The Presidency of Religious Affairs 
insists that Alevis must use mosques as Cemevis cannot be 
recognised as alternative places of worship. Secularism is openly 
confronted within the AKP circles. The Parliament Speaker Ismail 
Kahraman, for example, said in April 2016 that Turkey’s new 
constitution should drop all references to secularism and, as a Muslim 
country, Turkey should have a religious constitution. Those of the 
opinion that view secularism as atheism are gaining strength.  In 
February 2012, Erdogan said he wanted to raise a religious youth, 
which is inconsistent with secularism. Thousands of new mosques 
have been built, the age limit on Qur’an courses has been abolished, 
enrolment to Imam-Hatip schools (which provide religious education 
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and train Imams) has increased exponentially and compulsory religious 
education has been introduced. 
2. Kurdish issue 
The Kurdish initiative (or Kurdish peace process) was aimed at ending 
the protracted and violent conflict between the Turkish state and the 
Kurds by improving the political, social and economic rights of the 
Kurdish citizens. It created a positive atmosphere for the resolution of 
the problem, which covered a nearly 40-year conflict and cost over 
forty thousand lives. The release of the Democracy Party (Demokrasi 
Partisi) MPs in 2004, who had been in jail since 1994 for supporting 
Kurdish separatism, increased the credibility to the AKP government’s 
claims about the implementation of the Kurdish reforms (Bac 2005). 
While the legitimacy of the government’s secretive negotiations with 
the Kurdish group PKK was questioned widely, the de-escalation of the 
war and the possibility of a peace deal gained support from the majority 
of the population, which had been traumatised for decades. Despite the 
resistance from the military and the main opposition parties that had 
concerns regarding Turkey’s “unitary” structure, Kurdish ethnic identity 
was explicitly recognised, and measures were introduced to permit the 
greater use of Kurdish languages and an official TV channel in Kurdish 
was established.  
The relationship between the AKP and the Kurdish citizens, 
however, had an erratic pattern depending on the political conjuncture. 
The Kurdish issue has been instrumental for the AKP since it attracted 
a significant number of Kurdish votes. The AKP, therefore, considered 
reforms to resolve the issue as imperative. The government initiated 
secret negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (identified by the 
Turkish initials PKK) for a peace deal where the People's Democratic 
Party (identified by the Turkish initials HDP) played a facilitating role. 
The negotiations lasted for years and had ups and downs. Significant 
progress prior to elections was often followed by a period of 
deterioration, which revealed the functional role of the Kurdish issue for 
the AKP.      
The violence was on hold for almost two years (between 2013 
and 2015) and when a peace deal was seen as imminent, the 
“democratic initiative process” unexpectedly collapsed, the war with the 
PKK intensified and Turkey suffered a fierce circle of violence. The 
state of emergency (declared following the failed coup in 2016) 
targeted not only the Gulenists but also the Kurdish movement. The 
leaders of the HDP have been arrested and many civil servants 
(including teachers, judges and police) have been dismissed due to 
their alleged links to the PKK. 
During the “democratic initiative process”, the AKP had 
distanced itself from Turkish nationalism. Erdogan adopted remarkably 
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strong language against nationalism. The alliance between the AKP 
and the MHP over the new constitution, therefore, signified an 
astonishing U-turn for both parties. While the details of the agreement 
between these two parties are unknown, a plausible explanation can 
be provided based on the AKP’s presidential system ambitions, which 
will be investigated as a separate section below.  
3. External relations 
In the first few years of the AKP government, Turkey improved its 
relations with its neighbours under the “zero problems policy” and 
made rapid progress with its membership negotiations with the EU. 
Many believed that full membership to the EU was within reach.  
Significant progress was also made with the Cyprus problem. The 
Annan plan proposed a "United Republic of Cyprus" which would be a 
federation of two states. The plan, supported by the Turkish Cypriots, 
was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004.  
The AKP’s neo-Ottomanism and desire to become the leading 
power in the region, however, largely backfired. The zero problems 
policy turned into zero friends (Zalewski 2013). Turkey had serious 
confrontations with Syria, Israel, Russia, Iran, Iraq and Greece. 
Turkey’s involvements in Egypt and Syria, in particular, led to major 
problems with neighbours (Onis 2016). Eventually Turkey ended up 
without any allies in the region, which is termed by the former Prime 
Minister Davutoglu as a “dignified loneliness”.  
Relations with the EU soured significantly causing some EU 
member states to seek the suspension of further membership 
negotiations. The EU was a convenient security blanket for the AKP 
during the defensive phase. The hopes for the EU membership was the 
main reason for why the AKP avoided a shut down in 2008 when it 
faced charges for plotting an Islamic state. The EU had condemned the 
case and warned that the AKP's closure would damage Turkey's 
membership bid (Tait 2008). The EU was a crucial plea for keeping the 
military at bay since removing the AKP from power would jeopardise 
the EU membership. Moreover, the AKP’s commitment to the EU not 
only signalled that the concerns over secularism were baseless but that 
the EU membership would also ensure secularism and democracy. 
While the EU’s policies towards Turkey had not been trouble-free, the 
AKP’s need for the EU’s support declined substantially in the second 
phase and the EU membership requirements became a major obstacle 
to achieving its long-term objectives. The EU suddenly became an 
imperialistic block intervening in Turkey’s domestic affairs. Even 
warnings against the introduction of the death penalty was considered 
as an unjustified intervention. It is now widely recognised that the “AKP 
used the EU reform process as an instrument of political survival” 
(Saatcioglu 2014, p. 86).    
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To this day, no significant progress has been made over the 
Cyprus issue.  
The Role of Economy 
The economy has been the main strength of the AKP government in 
their first few years. Policies were designed to boost the economy in 
order to create a relative sense of economic wellbeing, which helped 
the AKP secure a series of election victories in the face of many 
internal and external shocks. Between 2002 and 2013, the annual 
average growth of nominal GDP was 12.2 percent, the nominal per 
capita GDP growth was 10.6 percent and the nominal exports growth 
was 12.4 percent (World Bank 2017). Inflation and budget deficit were 
brought under control. Despite large current account deficits and 
increasing external debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio remained low. The 
economy appeared to be resilient against internal and external shocks. 
The economy unremittingly grew between 2002 and 2008. While the 
nominal GDP declined from $730 billion in 2008 to $614 billion in 2009 
due to the global crisis, it recovered rapidly and returned back to $731 
billion in 2010. 
More importantly, poverty declined and the living conditions of 
the poor improved. The poverty headcount ratio – computed at the 
level of $3.10 a day (2011 PPP) – declined from 9.94 percent in 2002 
to 2.62 percent in 2013 (World Bank 2017).  
The World Values Survey provides two useful household income 
survey results. First, the respondents were asked how satisfied they 
were with the financial situation of their household on a scale from one 
to ten. One indicates complete dissatisfaction and ten indicates 
complete satisfaction. I aggregate 1-5 (dissatisfied) and 6-10 (satisfied) 
levels to indicate the level of overall satisfaction. The figure 2A shows 
that the percentage of the household satisfied with the financial 
situation was low in the first two survey waves (35 percent in 1989-
1993 and 34 percent in 1994-1998) and declined further to 25 percent 
in the third wave (1999-2004). It then increased to 63 percent and 64 
percent in the fourth (2005-2009) and fifth (2010-2014) waves, 
indicating a significant improvement in the satisfaction of households 
with their financial situation.  
Second, the respondents were asked to place their household 
income (counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes) on 
a subjective income scale, on which one indicates the lowest income 
group and ten indicates the highest income group in the country. The 
figure 2B shows that respondents that place themselves within the 
poorest 10% substantially increased from the first wave (4%) to the 
fourth wave (22%) but radically declined to 2% in the fifth wave. In 
other words, only 2% of the respondents considered themselves within 
the poorest 10% of the income scale. The same figures for the 
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respondents that place themselves within the poorest 30 percent were 
34 percent in the first wave, 62 percent in the fourth wave and 14 
percent in the fifth wave. While these are subjective indicators, they 
show a very strong improvement in the financial satisfaction of the poor 
sections of the society.  
Figure 2: Satisfaction of households with their financial situation 
A - Satisfaction with financial 
situation of household (%) 
B - Scale of incomes (%) 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey 
The economy was perceived to be the main strength of the AKP 
governments in the short and medium run but it turned out to be the 
main weakness in the longer run. Debt-driven growth is often 
unsustainable particularly if the external resources are used to 
stimulate consumption more than investment. Despite the above 
impressive growth figures, the economic success has been an illusion. 
The AKP adopted an economic strategy that boosted consumption to 
secure successive election victories. Turkey offered elevated real 
interest rates to attract substantial capital inflows (see figure 6) which 
caused overvalued exchange rates, mounting current account deficits, 
amplified external debt, and lower savings (imply higher consumption) 
and investment rates (Subasat 2014a).  
The AKP supporters often argue that large capital inflows and 
high external debt are not a major source of concern since the debt to 
GDP ratio in Turkey remains stable. This argument is misleading since 
external debt excludes the liabilities and true risks associated with 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment flows. In other words, 
external debt does not measure the true risks associated with total 
capital inflows. Figure 4 shows that the risk associated with capital 
inflows increased exponentially since the AKP came to power. 
The saving rates were 20.2 percent of the GDP on average 
between 1990 and 2001, which declined to 15.9 percent between 2002 
and 2015 (World Bank 2017). The same figures for the investment 
rates were 22.6 percent and 19.7 percent respectively. To put these 
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figures in better perspective, it should be noted that the first period 
involved one international (1997 Asian crisis) and one domestic crisis 
(in 2001), and a major earthquake in 1999. 
The economy became increasingly reliant in the construction 
sector, whose share in GDP increased from 4.5 percent in 2002 to 8.2 
percent in 2015 (OECD 2017). The state played a significant role in this 
increase through urban regeneration plans, social housing programs 
and several mega projects (Eraydin and Kok 2014). While housing is a 
necessity, a construction led growth strategy is bound to stagnate since 
the construction sector is an import dependent sector that generates no 
exports.  
The growth of nominal GDP, per capita GDP and exports were 
largely driven by the sharp decline in the value of the US dollar against 
all the major currencies (which was not unique to Turkey and similar 
trends were observed in most countries around the world) and the 
value gain of the Turkish Lira against the major currencies caused by 
the large capital inflows (Subasat 2014a). Once the artificial increase 
(due to exchange rate changes) is eliminated by using constant prices, 
however, the numbers look much less impressive. Figures 3A and 3B 
show that although GDP and exports in current prices increased 
substantially since 2002, no comparable increase is observed at 
constant prices. 
Figure 3: GDP and exports in current and constant prices in 
Turkey 
A: GDP (billions of dollars) B: Exports (billions of dollars) 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
These figures look much less impressive once Turkey’s 
performance is compared with the low, low-middle, high-middle and 
high-income country groups. According to Subasat (2014a), the 
Turkish economy grew faster than all the income groups between 1987 
and 1999, then deteriorated substantially between 1999 and 2002 as a 
result of a devastating earthquake in 1999 and a major financial crisis 
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in 2001. Despite attracting considerable external financial resources 
between 2002 and 2011, however, Turkey’s economic growth had 
been moderate and remained below that of the middle and low-income 
country groups. Turkey only grew faster than the high-income countries 
that experienced one of the worst economic crises in their history. 
Despite substantial capital inflows, therefore, the economic growth 
rates have been disappointing. Unlike the common perceptions, the 
export performance significantly deteriorated during the AKP period. 
Turkey was more successful than all the income groups between 1987 
and 1999, and less successful throughout the AKP period. The 
overvalued currency reduced the growth of real exports whereas the 
real import growth rates remained stable, resulting in large trade and 
current account deficits. 
While poverty declined in Turkey between 2002 and 2013, this 
was not unique to Turkey and most low and middle-income countries 
experienced similar trends. In fact, the decline in poverty looks less 
impressive when it is compared with other countries. Turkey was 
ranked 38th out of 56 countries in terms of the speed of poverty decline 
within the same period (World Bank 2017). 
Despite the government’s widespread propaganda regarding 
production of national tanks, aircraft, ships and satellite projects, by 
2023, the share of investment in GDP declined and high-tech exports 
remain very low. Turkey was ranked 101st in the world in terms of the 
share of high-tech exports in 2002 and was ranked 107th in 2014 
(World Bank 2017). 
The risks associated with excessive external borrowing have 
increased significantly since the AKP came to power. Heavy reliance 
on external financial resources creates significant risks but the risks are 
greater if the resources are used to support unproductive activities 
such as consumption and non-exports sectors. We have already seen 
that in Turkey the share of investment in GDP, export growth rates and 
domestic savings declined considerably since 2002 and the share of 
consumption increased. This implies that the external financial 
resources have been used to increase consumption rather than 
investment and exports. Uysal and Subasat (2016) developed an index 
to capture such risks. Figure 4 shows that the risks associated with 
external financial resources remained low between 1990 and 2003, 
and increased radically from 2004. The risk in 2014 is ten times higher 
than what it was in 2003.  
The cumulative real house prices, price-to-income ratios and 
price-to-rent ratios – which increased significantly preceding the 2008 
housing market crash – are often used to assess a housing bubble. 
Turkey was ranked 3rd out of 23 countries in terms of cumulative real 
house price changes between December 2010 and July 2016 (IMF 
2017a), 2nd out of 32 countries in terms of price-to-income ratio 
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(Cushman & Wakefield 2016) in 2016 and 1st out of 36 countries in 
terms of price-to-rent ratio in 2016 (IMF 2017b).   
Figure 4: External debt risk index 
 
Source: Uysal and Subasat (2016) 
Comparing housing prices in Turkey and the countries that 
recently experienced housing bubbles would provide useful information 
but Turkey has housing price data only since 2010. Buyukduman 
(2014), however, calculated an average price index for Istanbul since 
1998, which allows us to compare housing price changes in Istanbul 
with New York and London. Figures 5A and 5B show that Istanbul 
experienced a bubble comparable to both cities. The bubble (from 
boom to slump) covers the 1996-2008 period for London and the 1996-
2008 period for New York.  
The rapid real price increases started in 2002 in Istanbul and still 
continues. Figure 5A shows that the average annual price increase for 
the bubble period for Istanbul (2002-2016) has been higher than both 
London (1996-2008) and New York (1997-2006). Figure 5B shows that 
since the beginning of the bubble in Istanbul in 2002, the housing 
prices increased by 380 percent. The same figure for London was 290 
percent and for New York 210 percent before they experienced their 
crises. In other words, the average housing prices increased more 
quickly and for a longer time period in Istanbul than in London and New 
York. While Istanbul has not yet experienced a collapse of the bubble, 
the developments are worrying and a collapse appears to be imminent. 
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Figure 5: Housing prices in Istanbul, New York and London 
A: Average annual growth of 
housing prices 
(% real prices) 
B: Increase in housing prices 
between the beginning and the 
end of the bubbles 
(% real prices) 
  
Sources: Buyukduman (2014) for Istanbul, Freddie Mac (2017) for New 
York and Office for National Statistics (2017) for London. I would like to 
thank Dr Buyukduman for providing me with the latest housing price 
data for Istanbul.   
There are now signs that “Turkey’s economic miracle” might be 
rapidly coming to an end. The worsening external environment implies 
that the global liquidity is now drying up and Federal Reserve’s interest 
rate increases are likely to cause massive problems for countries that 
build their economies based on large capital inflows. Turkey’s GDP (in 
nominal dollars) contracted since 2013, Turkish Lira lost more than 30 
percent of its value against the dollar between September 2016 and 
January 2017 and unemployment increased rapidly from 8.7 percent in 
2013 to 11.6 percent in 2016 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2017). The 
credit rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) all reduced Turkey’s 
credit ratings in 2016. The Consumer confidence index declined from 
93.5 in 2004 to 65.7 in (February) 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute 
2017). These signs hint at either an approaching crisis or slower 
economic performance for a considerable period.    
The causes of economic success illusion 
The economic success in Turkey was an illusion and the following few 
points played a key role in its creation.  
First, as we discussed above, the AKP adopted an economic 
policy to boost consumption without enhancing production. This was 
possible due to the massive capital inflows (see the capital account in 
figure 6A), which were facilitated by the rapid increase in global liquidity 
during the 2000s. These capital inflows were supplemented by the 
substantial privatisation policies and real estate sales to foreigners.     
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Second, apart from the official capital inflows, Turkey received 
substantial unofficial external resources. The net error and omissions 
(NEO) of the balance of payments, which measures such unofficial 
capital flows, have increased considerably during the AKP period (see 
figure 6B). The cumulative NEO was negative between the 1975-2002 
period indicating net unofficial capital outflows. Since 2002, however, 
cumulatively it increased to $41.7 billion in 2016, indicating substantial 
unofficial capital inflows. A notable feature of the unofficial inflows is 
that they substantially increased during the election years. Figure 6B 
shows that the NEO increased substantially in 2003, right after the AKP 
came to power in November 2002. Another notable increase was in 
2011, which was an election year. The NEO increased to record levels 
in 2015, when there were two general elections as well as in 2016, a 
particularly difficult year due to the deteriorating economy and 
escalated political and social tensions. In fact, 51 percent of the 
unofficial capital inflows took place in 2015 and 2016; 70.9 percent in 
2011, 2015 and 2016; and 81.7 percent in 2003, 2011, 2015 and 2016; 
indicating that these flows were politically motivated. 
These figures are substantial but Subasat (2017) argued that 
the official NEO figures are just the tip of the iceberg. By using the 
official balance of payments statistics and the data on household 
foreign currency holdings, the actual unofficial capital inflows were 
estimated to be at least $110 billion. To put this figure in context, note 
that the total reserves of the Turkish Central Bank were $106 billion in 
December 2016. At present, we do not know who sent these resources 
to Turkey, how they did it, and for what specific purpose they have 
been used. It is not difficult to presume, however, that the resilience of 
the economy against various internal and external shocks and the 
relative satisfaction of lower income households with their financial 
situation can be linked to these capital inflows.  
Figure 6: Turkey’s Balance of Payments 
6A: The current and capital 
accounts (billions of dollars) 
6B: Net errors and omissions  
(billions of dollars) 
  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2017) 
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Third, the overvalued exchange rates (caused by capital inflows) 
also created a false sense of positive wealth effect by artificially 
cheapening imported goods. Households’ welfare increased faster than 
their sustainable income, which increased their satisfaction as well as 
their support for the AKP. 
Fourth, while there has not been a notable improvement in 
income distribution (Sonmez 2013), the living conditions of the poor 
improved significantly through the transformation of welfare policies. 
The rights based welfare system was not abandoned but a charity 
based welfare system was developed to achieve two main objectives: 
the Islamisation of the country and gaining the support of the poorest 
sections of the society. The direct social assistance schemes were 
expanded rapidly (Esen 2014). Various types of aid to the poor covered 
a wide range of areas: health, food, fuel, shelter, clothing, education, 
old age, caring for elderly, widowhood, etc. More than 13 million people 
are estimated to have benefited from these assistance schemes. In 
2015, a total of 25.8 billion Turkish Lira worth of social assistance (1.33 
percent of the GDP) provided over 600 Turkish Lira each month to poor 
households, a sum large enough to more than double the average 
monthly income (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2015). While this 
level of support for the poorest section of the society should normally 
be considered admirable, the direct social assistance policies often 
became a propaganda tool, and had a strong impact on the voting 
patterns of the poor. The Housing Development Administration not only 
contributed directly to the construction-led economic growth in Turkey 
but also helped the low and middle-income households by providing 
them with affordable housing.  
Fifth, the propaganda over the tripling of the GDP since 2002 
worked well and boosted the AKP’s popularity, even though no 
comparable income increase was experienced by individual 
households. This could be explained partially by Hirschman’s “tunnel 
parable” which claims that people initially tolerate their poverty because 
the improved income of the others creates expectations to catch up in 
the near future. The tunnel effect can be explained by the following 
example:  
Imagine you are driving in a two lane tunnel with both lanes 
headed in the same direction. All traffic is jammed as far as you 
can see – which is not very far. Suddenly the lane next to you 
starts to move. Initially you feel better, even though you are still 
stuck, because this signals to you that the jam has ended and 
your own lane will soon start moving too (Muthoo 2013). 
The rapid economic growth myth, therefore, may have 
transmitted a positive signal to the poor and middle-income households 
in Turkey. 
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Sixth, the five-year time period before the AKP came to power 
(1997-2001) had been the most difficult time period for Turkey, with two 
crises (one international in 1997 and one domestic in 2001) and a 
massive earthquake in 1999. This overlapped with vicious political 
disputes, high inflation rates and excessive levels of government debt. 
The late 1990s had been etched in the memory of the population as an 
extremely difficult period. The early AKP years, on the contrary, were 
considered as very auspicious due to low inflation, balanced public 
budget, (the illusory) high economic growth, political stability, the EU 
membership prospects and political initiatives (particularly over the 
Kurdish issue). The new rhetoric and faces in politics provided comfort 
and a glimmer of hope for the overwhelmed population.  
Seventh, the relatively low impact of the 2008 crisis on the 
Turkish economy (especially compared to its neighbouring European 
countries such as Greece), reinforced the AKP’s image of economic 
success. Indeed, the GDP contracted by 4.82 percent in 2009 but 
recovered quickly and increased back to its 2008 level in 2010. 
Turkey's banking sector had been significantly reformed after the crisis 
of 2000-2001, which contributed to the resilience of the economy. A 
stroke of good luck also played a significant role as the global toxic 
financial instruments were not injected into Turkey’s underdeveloped 
financial system (Icke et al. 2011). The strength of the banking sector 
turned the 2008 crisis into a short-term opportunity as Turkey was 
perceived as a safe haven for the international capital.  
Eight, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001 caused a significant decline in the prices of investment and 
consumer goods. The decline in prices helped to control inflation and 
led to a significant rise in prosperity, primarily by increasing the 
purchasing power of the poor. The AKP came to power one year after 
China’s entry into the WTO and took advantage of this positive wealth 
effect.  
Ninth, both fear mongering and hope mongering have been 
used extensively. After any major political and economic setback, the 
AKP raises the issue of internal and external enemies who are trying to 
stop Turkey’s enviable economic progress. An “upper wisdom” has 
become a convenient enemy to unite the nation around the 
government. While the “upper wisdom” is never properly defined, it 
comprises a widespread group of people, institutions and countries that 
may include – depending on the conjuncture – the Gulenists, the USA, 
the EU, the UK, Germany, France, Israel, Russia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Iran, Saudi Arabia; Armenian, Jewish and interest rate 
lobbies; global financial capital and the credit rating agencies. 
Accordingly, these enemies are responsible for the Gezi Park protests, 
the corruption allegations in 2013, the 2016 coup attempt, terrorism, 
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high interest rates, the depreciation of the Turkish Lira and any other 
problems that Turkey faces.  
Interestingly, while Turkey offered the highest levels of real 
interest rates in the world since the AKP came to power to attract more 
external resources, the “interest rate lobby” was conveniently used as a 
scapegoat for the high interest rates. Although, Erdogan advocates low 
interest rates and often confronts the Turkish Central Bank to achieve 
this objective, the Turkish economy has become so dependent on 
capital inflows to finance its current account deficits that attempts to 
lower the interest rates cause capital outflows and actually end up 
raising the interest rates again. Calling for lower interest rates also 
conflicts with the election rhetoric of the AKP that claimed that Turkey 
experienced lower interest rates since the AKP came to power. Indeed, 
the nominal interest rates have been lower due to lower inflation rates 
but the real interest rates have been amongst the highest in the world 
(See Subasat 2014a). 
After the Turkish Lira lost significant value against the US dollar 
between October 2016 and January 2017, the government claimed that 
the economy was fundamentally healthy and this was purely a 
malicious speculative attack against the Turkish economy. The 
government claimed further that those who participated in this assault 
were no different from terrorists and that the credit rating agencies 
(Moody's, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s) were their collaborators. The 
credit rating agencies had increased Tukey’s credit rating four or five 
times since the AKP came to power but reducing the credit rating just 
once (in the face of clear political and economic risks) was sufficient 
enough to declare these agencies as traitors.  
The AKP’s list of terrorists and their collaborators include the 
electors who voted no in the April 2017 constitutional referendum, 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (for raising 
doubts about the fairness of the referendum), some US politicians, 
bureaucrats and academics. The list included Preet Bharara (The US 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York) who oversaw the arrest 
of Reza Zarrab. Zarrab was arrested by Bharara in 2016 for conspiring 
to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran but he was also involved in the 
2013 corruption allegations in Turkey. 
The “2023 targets” are a good example for hope mongering, 
which have been used to foster a sense of false hope. The most 
important of these targets is to enter into the top ten largest economies 
of the world. None of the long-term global growth projections 
(conducted by Goldman Sachs, HSBC, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
OECD, CEIP, CEPII and IMF), however, placed Turkey within the first 
ten largest countries by 2023 (Subasat 2014b).  
Currently the tenth largest country is Canada with a GDP that is 
2.15 times larger than Turkey’s. To surpass Canada, Turkey’s nominal 
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GDP must grow 10.13 percent faster each year than Canada by 2023, 
which is clearly unrealistic. Moreover, the long-term global growth 
projections are notoriously difficult and there are reasons to think that 
Turkey may even fall behind its current rank. As we argued earlier, the 
Turkish economy grew based on foreign capital inflows that artificially 
inflated the economy since 2003. Because such growth is 
unsustainable, Turkey will inevitably face slower economic growth once 
capital inflows subside.  
Tenth, Turkey is a good example of the “authoritarian 
neoliberalism”, which may have increased the resilience of the 
economy against shocks. According to Bruff (2014, p. 113), “we are 
witnessing the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism, which is rooted in the 
reconfiguring of the state into a less democratic entity through 
constitutional and legal changes that seek to insulate it from social and 
political conflict”. Similarly, Onis (2016, p. 142) suggests that  
[a]mong the basic ideas behind this trend is the notion that 
capitalist development does not require liberal democracy. 
Instead, […] such development may be achieved in a minimally 
democratic environment based on competitive elections and a 
narrowly construed majoritarianism that pushes aside such 
principles as respect for the rule of law, safeguards for minority 
rights, and reverence for civil liberties.  
Accordingly, not only did the government create its own crony 
businesses, which are conveniently used during difficult times, but also 
the large businesses are frequently intimidated to act in certain ways 
the government wishes. According to “the crony-capitalism index” 
constructed by The Economist (2017), Turkey was ranked 12th out of 
22 countries in 2014, which increased to 8th in 2016. Irak (2015, p. 15) 
argues that “the political structure in Turkey during the AKP period 
mostly relied on a pan-Islamist crony capitalism based on the party’s 
own economic and social networks”. According to Bugra and Savaskan 
(2014), AKP used invitations rather than open bidding for public 
projects, which proves that the AKP government used the state 
initiatives to create its own crony capitalism (See also Gurakar 2016). 
In addition, the government told businesses to employ more workers 
and organize campaigns to encourage households to sell dollars.  
Finally, rapidly evolving technologies have led to the 
confounding of the concepts of “success” and “prosperity”. Rapid 
technological developments cheapened infrastructural works such as 
building roads, tunnels and bridges – works that were expensive in the 
past. The prosperity increases due to rapid technological developments 
have been perceived as the success of the government, which has 
given priority to particularly visible and high-profile projects. Double 
roads, shopping malls and “crazy projects” created profitable 
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opportunities for the crony businesses and defrauded the public. The 
tunnel effect may also be relevant here. While these projects are 
largely irrelevant for the needs of the poor, a general prosperity 
increase creates the hopes that it would trickle down to them 
eventually. Such projects also nurture the national pride and make 
people feel good about their own lives. 
Presidential System 
The increased authoritarianism, corruption allegations (which have yet 
to be investigated) and the establishment of a de facto presidential 
system (that was inconsistent with the constitution) broke the coalitions 
that the AKP had established with wide segments of society. These 
developments brought together the women’s organisations, the youth, 
professionals, trade unions, left wing organizations, Kurdish activists 
and the Alevis who were galvanized during the Gezi Park protests in 
2013 (Monroe 2017). The intensified conflict between the Erdoganists 
and Gulenists, the worsening relations with the EU and regional 
countries, and the deterioration in the economy forced the Erdoganists 
into a defensive position. To resolve these self-made problems, the 
presidential system was pushed on to the agenda and abolishing the 
parliamentary system became the number one priority of the AKP. 
Falling from power is not an option for the AKP. Not only would 
this terminate their regime change desires but it would force many AKP 
members to face legal charges. The June 2015 elections were a 
chilling warning that time was running out and the AKP needed to act 
swiftly. The AKP started propagating the “Turkish style presidential 
system” which signified an immensely powerful presidential system 
(hyper-presidentialism) via lessening the separation of powers 
(legislative, executive and judicial) leaving it without accountability. The 
Economist (2017) suggests “Turkey’s new constitution goes too far. 
The country would end up with a 21st-century sultan minimally curbed 
by parliament. A Yes would condemn Turkey to the elected dictatorship 
of President Erdogan”. 
The AKP claims that only a strong presidential system (by ruling 
out the possibility of coalition governments) could generate political 
stability and achieve rapid economic development. As The Economist 
(2017) rightly argues, however… 
… [this] kind of stability is hollow. The most successful 
democracies make a point of separating powers and slowing 
governments down […] Turkey is especially ill-suited to winner-
takes-all government. It is divided between secular, religious 
and nationalist citizens, as well as Turks, Kurds, Alevis and a 
few remaining Greeks, Armenians and Jews. If the religious-
conservative near-majority try to shut out everyone else, just as 
they were once shut out, Turkey will never be stable. 
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The empirical evidence also does not support the AKP claims. 
On the contrary, in terms of economic stability and growth, the 
parliamentary systems and coalition governments have been proven to 
be more successful than presidential systems and single party 
governments (McManus and Ozkan 2016; Nooruddin 2011; Subasat 
2013). The recent experiences in Turkey are a testimony to the failures 
of one-party system. The AKP has formed single party governments 
since 2002 and a de facto presidential system since 2014. Apart from 
the first few years of their governance, however, there has been neither 
political stability nor economic success. 
To form a presidential system, the AKP initiated the 
Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, which was established in 
2011 with the participation of all four major parties represented in the 
parliament. The stated aim of the Commission was to reform the 1982 
constitution, which carried the characteristics of the military regime 
(Kentel, Koker and Genc 2012). The AKP’s insistence on a presidential 
system, however, caused this initiative to fail.  This was the main 
reason why the AKP radically changed its Kurdish policy. 
The peace process increased the HDP’s votes rather than the 
AKP’s. The HDP’s progressive rhetoric over workers' rights, gender, 
environment and social justice won the hearts and minds of the people 
who were disillusioned with the increased AKP authoritarianism. The 
HDP won 13.1 percent of the votes in June 2015 and became the third 
biggest party in the parliament. The AKP’s votes declined from 49.83 
percent in 2011 to 40.87 percent. It became obvious that the HDP 
would not support the AKP with its presidential system ambitions in 
exchange for a peace deal. “We will not make you the president” was 
the motto of the HDP in the June 2015 elections. The Kurdish 
movement had become a major barrier for the regime change. 
For a regime change, the AKP required the support of either of 
the minor opposition parties (MHP and HDP) that were antagonistic to 
each other. Now that the HDP was unwilling to support the regime 
change, the AKP had no option but to play the nationalism card and 
approach to the MHP. Erdogan, who in 2013 famously said “we are a 
government that has trampled on all kinds of nationalism” and created 
furious reaction from the MHP, now adopted a nationalist rhetoric and 
the MHP, a party that had always been openly opposed to the 
presidential system, initiated the 2017 presidential referendum. The 
MHP was willing to support the AKP with its presidential system 
ambitions in exchange for an anti-Kurdish policy. 
The two-year peace process broke down rapidly. The pressure 
from the Western allies to play an active role in the coalition against 
ISIS was used “as an occasion to attack the PKK as part of the all-
around campaign against terror groups” (Onis 2016, p. 150). A bomb 
attack, which took place two days before the June 2015 general 
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elections in the HDP meeting in Diyarbakır, signalled the end of the 
peace process. There had not been a major terrorist attack since 11 
May 2013, which had killed 52 people in Reyhanli. Two more major 
attacks by ISIS took place leading up to the second general election in 
November 2015. On 20 July 2015, a bomb killed 34 young left wing 
activists in Sanlıurfa and 103 people were killed at the peace meeting 
in Ankara on the 10 October 2015. Turkey conducted the November 
2015 elections under these circumstances. 
The failure of the opposition parties to form a coalition 
government led to the general election in November 2015. The 
uncompromising position of the MHP was responsible for this failure. 
The Republican People's Party (identified by the Turkish initials CHP - 
the main opposition party in Turkey) even offered the Prime Minister 
position to the MHP leader Bahceli, which was rejected with some 
harsh words. The AKP claimed that only it could establish stability 
again, which was considered by the opposition parties as a blackmail 
tactic. The AKP’s motto in the elections was “vote for the AKP for 
stability and security”. The politics of fear helped the AKP (Onis 2016), 
which came back to power as a single-party government. “Pluralism 
and freedom of expression had moved down on the list of public 
concerns” (Onis 2016, p. 150). 
Turkey witnessed a vicious circle of violence in 2016 as 
The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK – a breakaway fraction of the 
PKK) responded to the ISIS bombings. According to Onis (2016, p. 
150), the PKK “played into the AKP’s hands by unwisely assuming that 
major powers would back a renewed push for an independent Kurdish 
state as a reward for Kurdish help against ISIS”. More than twenty 
terrorist attacks by TAK and ISIS killed over 300 people. This chaos 
was followed by the military coup attempt on 15 July 2016. The nature 
of this coup is still debated. While the government claims that it was 
organised by the Gulenists, the opposition parties (CHP and HDP) 
claim that this was a controlled coup attempt implying that the 
government was aware of the coup attempt in advance but allowed it to 
strengthen its position. Whoever is right about the nature of the coup 
attempt, it is clear from the following developments that it was a 
blessing for the AKP and was used as a pretext to oppress a wide 
range of opposition movements that disproportionately affected the 
Kurds.  
The Economist (2017) claims that since the failed coup, the 
government has demonstrated how cruelly power could be abused 
under a state of emergency. According to the magazine…  
… [roughly] 50,000 people have been arrested; 100,000 more 
have been sacked. Only a fraction of them were involved in the 
coup. Anyone Mr Erdogan sees as a threat is vulnerable: 
24
Markets, Globalization & Development Review, Vol. 2 [2017], No. 2, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/mgdr/vol2/iss2/6
DOI: 10.23860/MGDR-2017-02-02-06
ordinary folk who went to a Gülenist school or saved with a 
Gülenist bank; academics, journalists and politicians who betray 
any sympathy for the Kurdish cause; anybody, including 
children, who mocks the president on social media (The 
Economist 2017). 
The 15 April 2017 constitutional referendum took place under 
these circumstances. The state of emergency, one-sided media 
coverage and the lack of equal opportunities created an uneven 
playing field; and the electoral fraud allegations put the legitimacy of 
the constitutional referendum into question.   
Conclusions 
This paper argues that Turkey is going through a (counter) revolution. 
The adoption of the new constitution is not the end but a milestone on 
the way to establish the above-mentioned regime change. By 
equipping the president with immense powers, the new constitution 
opens avenues for further and more radical transformations. 
The AKP insists that Turkey is not turning into an authoritarian 
regime. According to the Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek, the 
April 2017 referendum was not to begin a regime change. Turkey is still 
a democracy with a secular state, which is run by the rule of law and 
dedicated to universal values, fundamental rights and freedoms 
(Camlibel 2017). The developments in Turkey over the last few years, 
however, strongly contradict these claims. 
To summarize, the AKP had a very promising start in 2002. All 
aspects of economic, political and social life witnessed significant 
improvements and the AKP received substantial domestic and 
international support. The AKP had the unusual opportunity to form the 
most powerful single-party government in Turkey’s recent history. 
Many commentators naïvely, in this author’s view, considered the AKP 
as one of the centre-right parties that have dominated Turkish politics 
since 1950. They were therefore surprised that it did not suffer from 
governmental fatigue, a familiar feature of Western democracies (Onis 
2016). Ersel (2013, p. 21) claimed, for example, that the…  
… founders of AKP were sincere about their intentions and 
wanted to establish AKP as a party of masses, and not a party 
solely for the deeply religious groups in the society. Their 
emphasis was strongly on human rights, democracy and in favor 
of “free” market system. In contrast to its predecessors, the 
AKP, at least initially, was careful not to be identified as anti-
Western.   
Regrettably, however, the AKP failed to fulfil its promises. Over 
time, the AKP became more authoritarian as it became more powerful. 
“The courts, the police, the intelligence services, the mosques, the 
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public education and health systems and the media are all, in one way 
or another, subject to the party’s overweening influence” (The 
Economist, 2017). Some commentators claimed that the AKP was 
poisoned by its own powers and became a victim of its own success 
(Hale and Ozbudun 2010). It was time for the AKP to get back to its 
“factory settings”. This interpretation was naïve. As The Economist 
(2016) reports…  
… [Early] in his career Mr Erdogan made a telling remark he 
was later to regret. Democracy is like a train, he said; you get off 
once you have reached your destination. Now many of his 
party’s critics fear that Turkey’s president may be getting close 
to that goal. 
The constitutional process provides us with important clues 
regarding what the AKP is trying to achieve. The new constitution was 
drafted by the AKP and MHP. It lacked a broader political consensus 
and involved no consultation from universities and NGOs. The 
constitutional referendum took place during the state of emergency 
under which democratic rights had been suspended and when the 
leaders of the third largest party, many journalists, and thousands of 
people had been jailed. The referendum process lacked equal 
opportunities, was reported on by one-sided media coverage, and was 
fraught with electoral fraud allegations. It was approved only by 51.4 
percent of the population, which is very low for a constitutional change 
that ought to be based on a broad social consensus. While all the 
above points put the legitimacy of the constitutional referendum into 
question, the AKP shows no sign of remorse. Given that the AKP had 
already established a de facto presidential system and that there is no 
reason to think that the new constitution is likely to resolve any of the 
problems Turkey faces, one important question remains to be 
answered: Why did the AKP rush through the new constitution despite 
the fact that the process lacked legitimacy? This paper argued that 
there is only one plausible explanation. Only an authoritarian regime 
could save the AKP. 
The AKP planned a regime change and acted accordingly. A 
regime change, however, is never an easy process. It is a nonlinear 
one that entails ups and downs, swings and fluctuations. In order to 
survive the defensive phase, the AKP adopted seemingly progressive 
policies to secure the support from wide sections of the society. It 
created an illusory economic “miracle” based on unsustainable policies, 
which helped to get the broad support it needed. The AKP has been 
remarkably successful in managing public opinion through 
propagandist techniques – a good example of manipulative marketing 
at a macro level. Little successes were exaggerated and major 
problems were underplayed. The AKP propaganda regarding the 
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economic success was mirrored in the writings of many liberal minded 
intellectuals who kept on repeating the same falderal of the decline in 
the illiteracy rate, the increase in urban population, increase in the total 
length of highways and roads (see for example Ersel 2013). 
Once it strengthened its powers and removed the threats, the 
AKP started the second phase where a regime change could begin. 
The AKP reacted to the rapidly changing environment pragmatically. 
What are sometimes observed as policy inconsistencies were in fact 
the AKP’s reactions to the changing environment in these two periods. 
The second phase required more authoritarianism since the fear of a 
regime change created a stronger opposition. The coalitions that the 
AKP had established collapsed one after another and the Kurdish issue 
became unsustainable. This phase also witnessed serious conflicts 
within the AKP and reactions from the outside world including the EU. 
The unsustainable economic policies had also reached their limits. An 
approaching economic crisis could mark the end of the “economic 
miracle.”   
The above points imply that the time was running out for the 
AKP. A wide array of opponents are eager for an opportunity to topple 
the AKP; their situation is now like riding a bike: it will fall if it stops 
pedalling. The June 2015 election results and the July 2016 military 
coup attempt implied that only a more authoritarian regime could save 
the AKP. Erdogan already acted like a president but needed extra 
powers, which would make it next to impossible to remove him.  
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